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 Executive Summary 
 
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change shifted the attention of the policy 
community from stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions to stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations. While this represents a step forward, it does not go far enough. We find that, 
given the uncertainty in the climate system, focusing on atmospheric concentrations is likely to 
convey a false sense of precision. The causal chain between human activity and impacts is laden 
with uncertainty. From a benefit-cost perspective, it would be desirable to minimize the sum of 
mitigation costs and damages. Unfortunately, our ability to quantify and value impacts is limited. 
For the time being, we must rely on a surrogate. Focusing on temperature rather than on 
concentrations provides much more information on what constitutes an ample margin of safety. 
Concentrations mask too many uncertainties that are crucial for policy making. 
   1
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The climate debate is fraught with uncertainty. In order to better understand the link 
between human activities and impacts, we must first understand the causal chain between the 
two, i.e., the relationship between human activities, emissions, concentrations, radiative forcing, 
temperature, climate, and impacts. The focus of the UNFCCC is on atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases. Although this represents a major step forward by advancing the debate 
beyond emissions, it does not go far enough. In this paper, we carry the analysis beyond 
atmospheric concentrations to temperature change. Although closely linked to concentrations, we 
believe that temperature is a more meaningful metric in that it incorporates several additional 
considerations critical for informed policymaking. In particular, the uncertainty related to climate 
sensitivity can dramatically alter the effectiveness of a prescribed concentration ceiling when 
trying to control temperature change. If the focus is on limiting atmospheric concentrations, 
policymakers may be given a false impression regarding the impact of their actions. 
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions will require fundamental changes in the way in 
which we produce, transform, and use energy.
1-3 How we go about making these changes will, in 
large part, determine the price tag for dealing with the threat of climate change. We can either 
make the necessary investments today to ensure ample supplies of low-cost alternatives in the 
future or we can continue the current decline in energy research, development, and 
demonstration (RD&D) and make do with high-cost substitutes that are already on the shelf. The 
present analysis examines the implications of choosing one path over another. 
                                                           
1 Edmonds, J. and M. Wise (1999). “Exploring a Technology Strategy for Stabilizing Atmospheric CO2”, in 
International Environmental Agreements on Climate Change, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands. 
2 Hoffert,  M.  I.  et al. (2002). “Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse 
Planet”, Science, 295, 981-987. 
3 Nakićenović, N., A. Grubler and A. McDonald (1998). Global Energy Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 
New York.   2
Providing a range of possible outcomes with no indication of their likelihood can be 
misleading.
4 Yet, the “curse of dimensionality” makes it extremely difficult for any one analysis 
to provide a formal treatment of all relevant uncertainties. At the very least, analysts can explore 
those uncertainties that may be most critical to the issue at hand. Here we attach subjective 
probabilities to: (a) income growth, (b) climate sensitivity, and (c) the rate of heat uptake by the 
deep ocean. We also deal with the uncertainty surrounding a temperature cap, but only through 
sensitivity analysis. 
Three caveats are in order. First, we note that specifying an absolute limit whether it be 
on concentrations or temperature, implies that damages are infinite beyond that limit. It would be 
preferable to employ a cost-benefit approach, balancing the costs of climate policy with what 
such a policy buys in terms of reduced damages.
5 Unfortunately, our understanding of the nature 
of future damages and how to value them is so rudimentary that a formal cost-benefit analysis 
would be questionable at the present time. For the current analysis, we use temperature as a 
surrogate, assuming that an absolute limit reflects a political decision as to what constitutes an 
“ample margin of safety.” 
Second, a critical assumption underlying the present analysis is that of complete “where” 
and “when” flexibility. That is, through trade in emissions rights, reductions will be made 
wherever it is cheapest to do so, regardless of the geographical location. Similarly, we allow 
banking and borrowing over time so that reductions will take place whenever it is cheapest to do 
so. This approach does not imply that reductions can be delayed indefinitely. Eventually, any 
temperature ceiling will become a binding constraint. To the extent that these two tenets of 
economic efficiency (where and when flexibility) are violated, the costs of a particular ceiling 
will be higher.
6 
Finally, we need to recognize the “act, then learn, then act again” nature of the decision 
problem. A key issue facing today’s decision makers is to specify the rate and magnitude of 
greenhouse gas reductions. This is not a once-and-for-all decision, but one that will be revisited 
                                                           
4  Moss, R. H. and S. H. Schneider (2000). “Uncertainties in the IPCC TAR: Recommendations to Lead Authors for 
More Consistent Assessment and Reporting”, in Guidance Papers on the Cross Cutting Issues of the Third 
Assessment Report of the IPCC, Pachauri, R., K. Tanaka and T. Taniguchi (Eds.), Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 33-51. 
5  Reilly, J., R. Prinn, J. Harnisch, J. Fitzmaurice, H. Jacoby, D. Kicklighter, J. Melillo, P. Stone, A. Sokolov and C. 
Wang (1999). “Multigas Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol”, Nature, 401, 549-555. 
6 Manne, A. S. and R. G. Richels (1997). “On Stabilizing CO2 Concentrations – Cost-effective Emission 
Reductions Strategies”, Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 2.   3
over time. There will be ample opportunity for learning and mid-course corrections. The 
challenge is to identify a sensible set of near-term decisions in the face of the many long-term 
uncertainties. This paper provides useful information for the decision-making process, but stops 
short of analyzing the question of what to do now. For an example of how such information can 
be used to determine a rational hedging strategy, see ref. 7. We believe that this is a crucial area 
for future research. 
 
2. The Model 
 
The analysis is based on MERGE (a model for evaluating the regional and global effects 
of greenhouse gas reduction policies). This section provides a brief overview of MERGE. For 
details on the model’s structure, data, and key information sources, the reader is encouraged to 
visit our website: www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE 
MERGE is an intertemporal general equilibrium model. There is international trade in oil, 
gas, and energy-intensive goods. Each of the model’s nine regions maximizes the discounted 
utility of its consumption subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Each region’s wealth 
includes capital, labor, and exhaustible resources. 
Like its predecessors, the current version (MERGE 5.0) is designed to be sufficiently 
transparent so that one can explore the implications of alternative viewpoints in the greenhouse 
debate. The model integrates sub-modules that provide reduced-form descriptions of the energy 
sector, the economy, emissions, concentrations, temperature change, and damage assessment.
8 
MERGE combines a bottom-up representation of the energy supply sector together with a 
top-down perspective on the remainder of the economy. For a particular scenario, a choice is 
made among specific activities for the generation of electricity and for the production of non-
electric energy. Oil, gas, and coal are viewed as exhaustible resources. There are introduction 
constraints on new technologies and decline constraints on existing technologies. 
Outside the energy sector, the economy is modeled through nested constant elasticity 
production functions. The production functions determine how aggregate economic output 
                                                           
7  Manne, A. S. and R. G. Richels (1995). “The Greenhouse Debate: Economic Efficiency, Burden Sharing and 
Hedging Strategies”, The Energy Journal, 16(4), 1-38. 
8 The current analysis, which focuses on cost-effectiveness analysis, does not employ the damage assessment sub-
module.   4
depends upon the inputs of capital, labor, electric and non-electric energy. In this way, the model 
allows for both price-induced and autonomous (non-price) energy conservation and for interfuel 
substitution. It also allows for macroeconomic feedbacks. Higher energy and/or environmental 
costs will lead to fewer resources available for current consumption and for investment in the 
accumulation of capital stocks. Economic values are reported in U.S. dollars of constant 2000 
purchasing power. 
A number of gases have been identified as having a positive effect on radiative forcing.
9 
In addition to CO2, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), MERGE 5.0 has been extended to 
incorporate the so-called “second basket” of greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Protocol. 
These are the hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), the perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6). 
For CO2, we relate emissions to concentrations using a convolution ocean carbon cycle 
model and assuming a neutral biosphere. The other gases are modeled with one-box models with 
constant lifetimes. In spite of these simple representations, projected gas concentrations agree 
well with those given in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Third 
Assessment Report (TAR)
10 for the SRES illustrative scenarios.
11 
We also consider the cooling effect of sulphate aerosols assuming that SO2 emissions 
follow the SRES B2 scenario in all cases (i.e., we assume that there is no “feedback” effect of 
greenhouse gas mitigation policies on the emissions of SO2). 
For radiative forcing we use relationships consistent with the TAR for greenhouse gases, 
and the median aerosol forcing from Wigley and Raper.
12 As shown in the latter, temperature 
projections are relatively insensitive to aerosol forcing uncertainties. 
Projections for the non-CO2 greenhouse gases are based largely on the guidelines 
provided by EMF 21: Multi-Gas Mitigation and Climate Change.
13 Reductions from the 
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reference path are determined by a set of time-dependent marginal abatement cost curves. For 
details, the reader is directed to the MERGE website. 
When dealing with multiple gases, we need some way to establish equivalence among 
gases. The problem arises because the gases are not comparable. Each gas has its own lifetime 
and specific radiative forcing. The IPCC has suggested the use of global warming potentials 
(GWPs) to represent the relative contribution of different greenhouse gases to the radiative 
forcing of the atmosphere.
14 However, a number of studies have pointed out the limitations of 
this approach.
15 In MERGE 5.0, we adopt an alternative approach. We make an endogenous 
calculation of the incremental value of emission rights for the non-CO2 greenhouse gases 
relative to CO2 in each time period. The marginal abatement costs then provide the necessary 
basis for the tradeoffs among gases.
16 
The Kyoto Protocol states that Annex B commitments may be met by “the net changes in 
greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removal by sinks resulting from direct human-
induced land use change and forestry activities limited to aforestation, reforestation, and 
deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in stocks in each commitment 
period.”
17 MERGE incorporates this option for offsets. We suppose that marginal sink 
enhancement costs rise with the quantity of enhancement. We assume that the potential for sink 
enhancement increases over time, but is eventually limited by the cumulative capacity for carbon 
absorption in forests. 
 
3. Treatment Of Technologies 
 
For the present analysis, we construct two technology scenarios. In the pessimistic 
(“business as usual”) case, we assume that the current downward spiral in energy RD&D
18 
                                                           
14 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (1996). Climate Change 1995, Report of Working Group III, 
Cambridge University Press, UK. 
15 Schmalensee, R. (1993). “Comparing Greenhouse Gases for Policy Purposes”, The Energy Journal, 14. 
16 Manne, A. S. and R. G. Richels (2001). “An Alternative Approach to Establishing Trade-offs Among Greenhouse 
Gases”, Nature, 410, 675-677. 
17 Conference of the Parties (1997). “Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change”,  Report of the Conference of the Parties, Third Session, Kyoto, 1-10 December, 
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1. 
18  According to the International Energy Agency, investment in energy RD&D declined by approximately 50% 
worldwide between 1980 and 1999, see ref. 17. 
19 IEA.   6
continues unabated, and that the transition to a less greenhouse gas intensive economy is 
achieved with technologies that are currently on the shelf or in the marketplace. In the optimistic 
scenario, we are much more sanguine. A reversal of current investment trends in energy RD&D 
leads to a much brighter technological future. 
Clearly, technology investment will be influenced by the price that society places on 
greenhouse gases. If a high price is deemed warranted, the current downward trend in energy 
RD&D is more likely to be reversed. Although there are differences in RD&D costs between the 
two scenarios, we ignore these differences and quantify only the differences in payoffs. This is 
justifiable because, in general, we find that RD&D costs are measured in billions of dollars, but 
that the payoffs could run into the trillions. The payoff is determined by the costs of meeting a 
particular climate goal with and without the advanced supply and demand-side technologies 
described below. 
The detail in which technology is described in a particular analysis depends on the focus. 
For the present analysis, we attempt to examine the differences between being in a technology-
rich and technology-poor world. We are particularly interested in the impacts of such differences 
on the timing and costs of emission reductions. The level of detail for such an analysis requires 
assumptions about the availability, costs, performance characteristics, and greenhouse gas 
emissions from various categories of technologies and how these parameters change across space 
and time. The level of specificity would be much greater if we were to model the competition 
between different approaches within a particular category of technology. Whereas such detail is 
necessary to address certain questions, it is not called for here. 
In MERGE, a distinction is made between electric and non-electric energy. Table 1 
identifies the alternative sources of electricity supply. The first five technologies represent 
sources serving electricity demand in the base year (2000). The second group of technologies 
includes candidates for serving electricity needs in 2010 and beyond. The composition of the 
latter group differs in our two scenarios. 
In the pessimistic scenario, we assume that future electricity demand will be met 
primarily with new, state-of-the-art gas and coal plants. In addition, there is a technology to 
which we refer to as ADV-HC (advanced  high-cost carbon-free electricity generation). Its 
distinguishing characteristic is that, once introduced, it is available at a high but constant 
marginal cost. Any of a number of technologies could be included in this category: solar (in   7
several forms), advanced nuclear, biomass, and others. For a discussion of possible candidates, 
see ref. 2. Given the enormous disagreement as to which of these technologies or combination of 
technologies will eventually win out, in terms of economic attractiveness and public 
acceptability, we refer to them generically rather than attempt to identify one or two winners. 
Because knowledge is not fully appropriable, private markets are likely to underinvest in 
RD&D.
20 For our optimistic scenario, we assume that this market imperfection is overcome 
through a sustained commitment on the part of the public sector to direct investment, the subsidy 
of private sector RD&D, or both. As a result, fuel cells, and integrated gasification combined 
cycle with carbon capture and sequestration are added to our list of technologies. We also add a 
category similar to ADV-HC, but whose learning costs decline by 20% for every doubling of 
capacity. This is called LBDE (learning-by-doing, electric). LBDE provides a learning 
component to those technologies grouped under ADV-HC.
21 
Table 2 identifies alternative sources of nonelectric energy within the model. Notice that 
oil and gas supplies for each region are divided into 10 cost categories. The higher cost 
categories reflect the potential use of non-conventional sources. With regard to carbon-free 
alternatives, the choices have been grouped into two broad categories: RNEW (low-cost 
renewables such as ethanol from biomass) and NE-BAK (high cost backstops such as hydrogen 
produced through photovoltaics and electrolysis). The key distinction is that RNEW is in limited 
supply, but NE-BAK is assumed available in unlimited quantities at a constant but considerably 
higher marginal cost. As in the case of electric energy, we have added a new category of 
technologies for our optimistic scenario. This is called LBDN (learning-by-doing, non-electric). 
As with its counterpart in the electric sector, costs are a declining function of cumulative 
experience.  
Except for the learning-by-doing component, we assume that the costs of all technologies 
decline at a rate of 0.5% per year beginning in 2000. This is the case for both the pessimistic and 
optimistic scenarios. 
The energy-producing capital stock is typically long-lived. In MERGE, introduction and 
decline constraints are placed on all technologies. For new technologies, we assume that 
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production in each region is constrained to 1% of total production in the year in which it is 
initially introduced and can increase by a factor of three for each decade thereafter. The decline 
rate is limited to 2% per year. The decline rate, however, does not apply to existing technologies. 
This is to allow for the possibility that some climate constraints may be sufficiently tight to force 
premature retirement of existing capital stock. 
Turning to the demand-side, to allow for greater progress at the point of end-use, we 
assume that the long-run price elasticities are 25% higher in the optimistic technology scenario. 
Here we assume that we succeed in removing the barriers to increased efficiency and that the 
costs of doing so do not outweigh the benefits. 
 
4. Treatment Of Uncertainty 
 
In this paper, we attempt to compare the costs of stabilizing global-mean temperature in a 
technology-rich and a technology-poor world. Mitigation costs will depend not only on the 
characteristics of the energy system, but also on a number of socioeconomic and scientific 
considerations each of which is highly uncertain. These include factors influencing future 
greenhouse gas emissions, the carbon cycle, radiative forcing, climate sensitivity, and the 
efficiency with which heat is transferred from the surface into the deeper ocean. It would be 
virtually impossible to include all of these factors in a rigorous probabilistic analysis. Rather, we 
have chosen to focus on three areas of uncertainty that we feel are particularly relevant to the 
present analysis. The dominant importance of future emissions and climate sensitivity to global-
mean temperature is well documented.
11,23 In addition, because of the importance of the lag 
between potential and realized temperature change to the present analysis, we add response time 
to our list of critical uncertainties.
24 
Future greenhouse gas emissions are particularly difficult to project. In a previous study 
we examined the sensitivity of the emissions of carbon dioxide to five factors: potential 
economic growth; the elasticity of price-induced substitution between energy, capital, and labor; 
the rate of non-price induced energy efficiency improvements; the availability of economically 
competitive carbon-free alternatives to coal-fired electricity; and the costs of the nonelectric 
                                                           
23 Caldira, K. et al. (2003). “Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty”, Science, 299, 2052-2054. 
24  The response time is defined as the time it takes for the temperature to reach (1 – 1/e) of the equilibrium response 
– see Appendix.   9
backstop alternative to liquid fuels.
25 The analysis showed that economic growth was by far the 
most important determinant of future emissions. Figure 1 shows five projections of growth over 
the 21
st century and the authors’ subjective probability for each.
26 
Climate sensitivity is defined as the equilibrium global-mean surface temperature change 
in response to a doubling of CO2 concentrations. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) in 
Figure 3 corresponds to the log-normal probability distribution adopted by Wigley and Raper 
(ref. 11). For purposes of the present analysis, we focus on the tails of the distribution. This 
yields discrete probabilities of 5%, 90%, and 5% for climate sensitivities of 1.3°, 2.6°, and 5.0°C, 
respectively. 
As noted in refs. 11 and 22, the two properties that control the climate system’s decadal 
to century response to radiative forcing are the climate sensitivity and the rate of heat uptake by 
the ocean. The rate at which heat is transferred from the surface into the deeper ocean is 
determined by the climate sensitivity, the ocean’s effective vertical diffusivity, and changes in 
the ocean’s thermohaline circulation. In the MERGE climate model, the rate of ocean heat 
uptake is characterized by a single (response time) parameter. The values used for this time scale 
are based on a calibration of the model against the upwelling-diffusion, energy-balance model 
(MAGICC) used in the IPCC TAR (ref. 9) and in ref. 11 (see Appendix). Figure 4 shows the 
response time for alternative climate sensitivities, accounting for thermohaline circulation 
changes and uncertainties in vertical diffusivity. 
For purposes of the analysis that follows, we calculate discrete conditional probabilities 
based on each of the 3 CDFs in Figure 4, again focusing on the tails of the distribution. See 
Table 3. 
 
5. Why Is Temperature A More Meaningful Metric Than Atmospheric Concentrations? 
 
Having discussed our numerical inputs, we now turn to the analysis. First, we address the 
issue of a stabilization metric. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change shifted the 
attention of the policy community from stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions to stabilizing 
                                                           
25 Manne, A. S. and R. G. Richels (1994). “The Costs of Stabilizing Global CO2 Emissions: A Probabilistic 
Analysis Based on Expert Judgments”, Energy Journal, 15(1). 
26 These projections coincide remarkably well with the full range of SRES (ref. 10) scenarios for the year 2100.   10
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. While this represented a step forward, it did not go 
far enough. Concentrations are not the end of the line, but only one more link in the causal chain 
between human activities and impacts. In the present analysis, we go beyond atmospheric 
concentrations to temperature. Not only does the focus on temperature avoid the problems 
associated with the use of GWPs, but it also provides a more meaningful metric for policy-
making purposes. 
The following experiment illustrates why we believe temperature to be a better choice of 
metric. Suppose that there are 1) two alternative temperature ceilings: 2°C and 3°C, 2)  two 
possible technology futures as defined earlier: pessimistic and optimistic, and 3)  economic 
growth follows our median projections. The calculations shown in Table 4 are based on the 
MERGE model. Note that for a particular temperature cap and technological future, the 
associated CO2 concentrations can vary widely. Interestingly, although ocean heat uptake has 
some influence, we find that climate sensitivity turns out to be far more important in determining 
allowable concentrations. 
Suppose that the ceiling is 2°C and the pessimistic technology scenario materializes. In 
this case, the corresponding CO2 concentration target spans a range approaching 300 ppmv. 
There is one chance in 20 that the concentration ceiling required to stabilize temperature at the 
prescribed level will be 452 ppmv or less. This corresponds to high climate sensitivity. There is 
also one chance in 20 that the limit in 2100 exceeds 743  ppmv. Here we have low climate 
sensitivity. The median value turns out to be 482 ppmv and corresponds to the median value for 
climate sensitivity. The range is somewhat narrower for the 2°C ceiling under the optimistic 
technology scenario. This is because the cost of carbon free substitutes is such that more 
emphasis is placed on reducing CO2 emissions and less emphasis on the other alternative gases. 
The findings are qualitatively similar for a 3°C cap. However, here there is much less pressure to 
constrain emissions. Indeed for the 95
th percentile, emissions track the baseline. Again, the latter 
scenarios correspond to low climate sensitivity.  
Given the current uncertainties in our understanding of the climate system, it is 
impossible to project with any degree of confidence the effect of a given concentration ceiling on 
temperature. Or conversely, for a particular temperature cap, the required concentration ceiling is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 Forest, C. E., P. H. Stone, A. P. Sokolov, M. R. Allen and M. Webster (2002). “Quantifying Uncertainties in 
Climate System Properties with the Use of Recent Climate Observations”, Science, 295, 113-117.   11
highly uncertain. This calls into question the current focus on atmospheric concentrations. At the 
very least, we may want to shift the focus to temperature and then identify the implications for 
concentrations. This would give policy makers a more realistic understanding of the potential 
consequences of their actions. 
 
6. Temperature Change In The Absence Of Climate Policy 
 
We next turn to the issue of the impacts of a temperature constraint on mitigation costs. 
The first step is to examine the non-policy baseline. Using MERGE, we estimate cumulative 
distribution functions (CDFs) for our two technology scenarios in the absence of policy to 
mitigate climate change. From Figure 5, we see that the range is consistent with the recent IPCC 
projections (see refs. 9 and 10). Whereas the IPCC presents a range of 1.4° to 5.8°C between 
1990 and 2100, we project a range of 1.2° to 5.5°C between 2000 and 2100.
28 Allowing for the 
warming from 1990 to 2000, these two sets of projections are virtually identical. 
However, unlike the IPCC, we assign probabilities to various outcomes. The analysis 




th percentiles for each of the two technology scenarios. For the pessimistic scenario, there is 
only one chance in 20 that the temperature increase will be less than 2.1°C or more than 3.6°C. 
Notice that shifting from the pessimistic to the optimistic scenario results in only a 
modest shift in the CDF. The explanation is straightforward. Suppose that all parameters were to 
take on their median values. The difference in emissions between the two technology scenarios 
can be attributed to two factors: 1) learning-by-doing which drives down the price of the electric 
backstop technologies to the point where they are economically competitive with conventional 
gas and coal, and 2) the long-run price elasticities. However, from Figure 2, note that the 
emission baselines representing the median values do not diverge substantially until the second-
half of the century. With a climate sensitivity of 2.6°C, the response time is of the order of 25 
years. Hence, we should not be surprised to see so little difference in the median values for 
temperature change in 2100. With the higher climate sensitivity, the response time is such that 
there is insufficient time for substantial divergence in temperature by 2100. With the lower 
                                                           
28 Note that all estimates of warming in this paper are measured from the year 2000.   12
climate sensitivity, the rate of temperature change is so small that the faster response times have 
little influence. 
Because we have focused on the tails of the distributions for climate sensitivity and 
response time, the distributions tend to rise sharply for the middle fractiles. We would see a less 
rapid rise in the CDFs if we were to use more points in characterizing the individual 
distributions, but there would be little change in the tails of the distributions and in their median 
values. 
 
7. A Ceiling On Temperature Increase 
 
We now turn to the issue of temperature ceilings. We begin with a 2°C cap on 
temperature increase from 2000. This may seem ambitious given that approximately 95% of the 
outcomes in Figure 5 exceed this level by 2100. One measure of the difficulty of meeting a 
temperature ceiling is how fast we must depart from the emissions baseline. Although we are 
focusing on temperature as a constraint rather than atmospheric concentrations, the issue remains 
one of cumulative CO2 emissions. For any given climate sensitivity, a global-warming ceiling 
defines a carbon budget. The challenge is to determine how the budget should be allocated over 
time to meet the climate goal at minimum cost. 
Figure 6 shows the cost-effective rate of departure for the pessimistic and optimistic 
scenarios. Notice that the rate of departure begins slowly and increases over time. This is 
consistent with “when” flexibility.
29 A gradual rate of departure reduces the pressure to 
prematurely retire existing long-lived capital stock (e.g., power plants, buildings, and transport) 
and provides more time to develop and introduce new, economically competitive carbon-free 
technologies into the energy system. 
Interestingly, the rate of the departure from the baseline through 2030 is virtually 
insensitive to the technology scenario. The explanation has to do with the timing and costs of the 
new technologies and the size of the carbon budget. The near-term options for reducing CO2 
emissions are limited to fuel switching from coal and oil to natural gas, and to price-induced 
conservation. This is because the payoff from technology investment is “back loaded.” The 
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Stabilization of Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations”, Nature, 379, 240-243.   13
development and deployment of new technologies does not happen overnight. The payoff is 
initially modest, but increases over time. Fortunately, with a 2°C cap there is still some leeway to 
emit CO2. It makes sense to use what remains of the carbon budget in the early years when the 
alternatives are expensive and to transition gradually to a less carbon-intensive economy. 
Even if we are pessimistic about the technological future, using the remainder of the 
carbon budget early-on reduces the need for a precipitous reduction in the existing carbon-
producing and carbon-using capital stock. Hence, regardless of one’s views on technology, this 
makes little difference in the initial rate of departure from the baseline. This is the case whether 
we are focusing on the median or the tails of the CDFs, see Table 6. 
A second measure of the difficulty of meeting a constraint is the implicit price that would 
have to be placed on carbon to meet the particular goal. That is, how high would we have to raise 
the price of carbon-intensive technologies to make them less desirable than the noncarbon-
venting alternatives? 
Figure 7 shows the magnitude of the carbon tax that would be required to limit the 
temperature increase to 2°C. The tax is computed for 2010, 2020, and 2030 for each of the 
technology scenarios. Note that the results appear sensitive to our technological perspective. That 
is, the less sanguine we are about the prospects for low-cost alternatives, the higher the carbon 
tax in the early years. This is because, when accounting for future developments, the 
economically efficient tax will rise at a rate approximating the return on capital. The long-term 
price of energy will govern the initial level of the tax. The more pessimistic we are about the 
long term, the higher the tax in the near term. 
From Table 7, we see that the distributions are skewed to the right. This reflects the 
difficulty of maintaining a temperature cap of 2°C when climate sensitivity is high and/or we 
have a rapid response time. 
But what if we were to have a higher cap, say 3°C? From Figure 5, approximately 95% of 
the outcomes exceed 2°C. Two-thirds of the outcomes exceed 3°C for the pessimistic technology 
scenario and only one-quarter of the outcomes exceed 3°C for the optimistic technology 
scenario. Also, from Figure 5, note that for the majority of the outcomes that exceed 3°C, the 
amount by which this threshold is exceeded tends to be minor. 
Figure 8 compares the carbon taxes in 2010 required to maintain 2° and 3°C caps. In each 
case, the tax is computed for the pessimistic and optimistic technology scenarios. As we would   14
expect, the difficulty of maintaining a 3°C cap is considerably less than that for a 2°C cap. With 
a 3°C ceiling, we would also expect a lower carbon tax trajectory and a slower rate at which 
emissions depart from the baseline. 
 
8. The Role Of Technology In Containing The Costs Of Climate Policy 
 
There has been a 50% decline in energy RD&D worldwide since 1980. For the present 
analysis, we suppose that the continuation of this trend will result in the pessimistic technology 
scenario. Conversely, the optimistic scenario is designed to reflect a reversal of current trends. In 
this section, we explore the benefits from an RD&D effort sufficient to bring about the more 
optimistic of our two technological futures. 
Care must be taken to define what is meant by benefits. Losses are incurred when the 
imposition of a temperature constraint leads to a reallocation of resources from the patterns that 
would be preferred in the absence of the constraint. A temperature constraint will lead to fuel 
switching and to more expensive price-induced conservation activities. There are also changes in 
domestic and international prices. In most cases, these forced adjustments result in a reduction in 
economic performance. Low cost, carbon-free substitutes can reduce this loss in economic 
performance. It is this reduction in losses that is referred to as the benefits of RD&D. 
In calculating benefits, we do not subtract the costs of the additional RD&D. That is, we 
deal with gross, not net, benefits. Nor do we account for the reduced environmental damages 
resulting from the temperature constraint. In the case of the latter, we assume that climate goals 
will be met with whatever technologies are available. Hence, environmental benefits will be the 
same in both the pessimistic and optimistic scenarios. 
We begin with a 2°C temperature cap. Figure 9 compares discounted consumption losses 
for each of the two technology scenarios. Over the period of a century the losses can be of the 
order of trillions of dollars. However, the figure suggests that the losses can be reduced 
substantially if we are successful in achieving the more ambitious technology objectives. 
Table 8 shows the discounted present value of consumption losses under the two 
technology scenarios for the 5
th, 50
th, and 95
th percentiles. The Table also shows the differences 
in consumption losses between the two scenarios. That is, these are the benefits from moving 
from the pessimistic to the optimistic technology scenario.   15
Figure 10 compares the benefits for the 2° and 3°C temperature caps. As we would 
expect, the payoff declines as the stringency of the constraint is weakened. Nevertheless, the 
payoff is still likely to be substantial even with the higher temperature cap. 
 
9. The Relative Contribution Of The Various Greenhouse Gases To Radiative Forcing 
 
As noted earlier, the analysis encompasses the six categories of greenhouse gases 
identified in the Kyoto Protocol. With our focus on the energy sector and the costs of meeting a 
particular temperature ceiling in a technology-rich and technology-poor world, our attention has 
been on CO2. It is interesting, however, to note the contribution of the other gases in meeting the 
temperature constraints. Figure 11 shows our projections for the globally and annually averaged 
anthropogenic radiative forcing due to changes in the concentrations of greenhouse gases over 
the 21
st century.
30 Here the second basket of gases (the HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) are combined 
under just two categories: short-lived fluorinated gases (SLF) and long-lived fluorinated gases 
(LLF).
31 
Among the non-CO2 greenhouse gases, CH4 with its relatively short lifetime (12 years) 
makes the greatest contribution to meeting the temperature ceilings. The impact of the relative 
cost of abatement can be seen when comparing the 3°C cases. Under the optimistic technology 
scenario, less pressure is placed on reducing CH4. This is because CO2 abatement is relatively 
inexpensive when compared with the pessimistic scenario. The short-lived fluorinated gases also 
play a role, but there are insufficient quantities to offset the need for large CO2 reductions. 
 
10. Some Concluding Remarks 
 
The analysis has yielded some policy-relevant results. We find that, given the uncertainty 
in the climate system, focusing on atmospheric concentrations is likely to convey a false sense of 
                                                           
30  The temperature cap is imposed in all periods. Because MERGE is an intertemporal optimization model, there 
may be some minor differences between scenarios with regard to the year that the cap becomes binding. For this 
particular example, we adopt the median values for income growth, climate sensitivity and response time. 
31 There are a large number of second basket gases, which are modeled in MERGE using a representative short-lived 
fluorinated gas (HCF134a) and a representative long-lived fluorinated gas (SF6). An equivalent concentration of 
HCF134a is used to represent all gases with short lifetimes (less than 65 years), while an equivalent concentration 
of SF6 is used to represent all gases with longer lifetimes. Total radiative forcing changes for all second basket 
gases can be modeled quite accurately by this simple representation.   16
precision. The causal chain between human activity and impacts is fraught with uncertainty. 
From a benefit-cost perspective, it would be desirable to minimize the sum of mitigation costs 
and damages. Unfortunately, our ability to quantify and value impacts is limited. For the time 
being, we must rely on a surrogate. Focusing on temperature rather than on concentrations 
provides much more information on what constitutes an ample margin of safety. Concentrations 
mask too many uncertainties that are crucial for policy making. 
For the “no policy” case, the analysis produces a temperature range for 2100 that is 
similar to that of the IPCC. However, unlike the IPCC, we attempt to determine the likelihood of 
various temperature outcomes. This is done by assigning probabilities to three critical areas of 
uncertainty: those relating to future economic activity, climate sensitivity, and how quickly the 
temperature system responds to changes in radiative forcing. The results suggest that the 
temperature projections at the tails of the range are far less likely than those in the middle. 
Focusing on the energy sector and CO2, the analysis confirms previous findings 
suggesting that, for a given constraint, a gradual departure from the emissions baseline is 
preferable to a more rapid departure. This result appears to be insensitive to one’s expectations 
about the long-term price of greenhouse gas abatement. However, such expectations do have a 
substantial effect on the near-term price of abatement. Specifically, the more optimistic one’s 
views about the future availability of low-cost carbon-free substitutes, the lower the near-term 
carbon tax. 
The analysis also suggests that investment in energy RD&D is no “magic bullet,” but it 
can substantially reduce the economic losses arising from mitigation associated with a 
temperature constraint. Stabilizing temperature is likely to require a fundamental restructuring of 
the global energy system. It is hard to imagine that the costs will not be substantial. But 
investments in the broad portfolio of energy technologies required to meet the emerging needs of 
both developed and developing countries can dramatically reduce the size of the price tag. 
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Table 1. Electricity Generation Technologies Available to U.S.
32 

















































37.8   0.2094 
COAL-R 
 









2010 30.3    0.0935 
GAS-A 
 
Fuel cells with capture 
and sequestration 
2030  47.7    0.0000 
COAL-N 
 
Pulverized coal without 
CO2 recovery 
2010 45.0    0.1955 
COAL-A 
 
Fuel cells with capture 
and sequestration 




and combined cycle 
with capture and 
sequestration 
2020




technologies; costs do 
not decline with LBD 






decline with LBD 
2010  100.0  70.0  0.0000 
 
                                                           
32 Introduction dates and costs may vary by region. 
33  Except for oil and gas costs and the learning-by-doing component, we assume that the cost of all technologies 
decline at a rate of 0.5% per year beginning in 2000. Note that this column is used to calculate the autonomous 
learning component. The earliest possible introduction date is specified in the previous column. 
34 IGCC is currently available: however, without capture and sequestration. 
35  For the LBDE technologies, it is necessary to specify an initial quantity. We assume that the cumulative global 
experience prior to 2000 is only 0.2 TkWh.   18
Table 2. Nonelectric Energy Supplies Available to U.S.
* 
(shaded row represents technology only available in the optimistic scenario) 
Technology 
name 









(tons of carbon 
per GJ) 
CLDU Coal-direct  uses  2.50    0.0241 
OIL-1-10   Oil  3.00-5.25    0.0199 
GAS-1-10 Gas  2.00-4.25    0.0137 
SYNF Coal-based 
synthetic fuels 
8.33   0.0400 
RNEW Renewables  6.00    0.0000 
NEB-HC Nonelectric 
backstop 
14.00   0.0000 
LBDN
‡  Carbon-free  14.00  6.00  0.0000 
                                                 
* Costs may vary by region. 
† Except for the learning-by-doing component, we assume that the costs of all technologies decline at a rate 
of 0.5% per year beginning in 2000. 






Table 3. Response Times (years) 
Climate Sensitivity  Discrete 
Conditional 
Probability  1.3°C 2.6°C 5.0°C 
5% 4  15  57 
90% 5  25  96 
5% 8  39 158 
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Table 4. Peak Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations (PPMV)  
Under Alternative Temperature Caps 









Pessimistic 452  482  743
* 
2°C 
Optimistic 445  465  654* 
Pessimistic 499  587  788
† 
3°C 
Optimistic 485  580  658† 
                                                 
* Concentrations to rise after 2100. Emissions reduced below baseline. 





Table 5. Likelihood of Temperature Change Over the 21
st Century  










Pessimistic technology scenario  2.1°C
  3.1°C 3.6°C 





Table 6. Percentage Reduction from the Baseline (percent)  
for a 2°C Cap on Temperature 
  Pessimistic Technology  
Scenario 




















2010  0  5 20 0  3 19 
2020  1  9 37 0  7 40 
2030  1 19  53 0 19  60 
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Table 7. Price of Carbon ($/ton) with a 2°C Cap on  
Temperature Increase from 2000 
  Pessimistic Technology  
Scenario 




















2010 2  36  212  0  22 176 
2020 4  62  355  0  37 255 





Table 8. Difference in Consumption Losses for Two Technology Scenarios Under  










Consumption losses under 
pessimistic scenario 
1.0 9.0  30.0 
Consumption losses under 
optimistic scenario 
0.0 3.5  17.7 
Benefits of optimistic scenario   1.0  5.5  12.3   21
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Figure 5. Temperature Increase During 21
st Century in the Absence of  
Mitigation Policy  (50
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Figure 6. Reductions in Carbon Emissions from the Baseline with 2°C Temperature Cap  
During 21
st Century  (50
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Figure 7. Carbon Prices with 2°C Temperature Cap  (50
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Figure 9. Present Value of Consumption Losses Over 21
st Century with 2°C  
Constraint on Temperature Increase  (50
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10. Gross Benefits from R&D Program Under Alternative  
Temperature Constraints  (50
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Appendix 
 
A1. Climate model 
The climate model in MERGE is a simple one-box model where the box represents the 
ocean and its size defines the thermal inertia of the climate system. This in turn determines the 
lag between externally-imposed forcing and global-mean temperature response. While this is 
clearly an oversimplification of the climate system, such a model can still be used to characterize 
the response to external forcing in a quantitatively realistic way by calibrating the model against 
more realistic models. 
In a one-box model, the response is determined by two parameters: a climate sensitivity 
that defines the equilibrium response and a time scale or “response time” (equivalent to the box 
size) that defines how rapidly the system approaches equilibrium. Defining a suitable single time 
scale for global-mean temperature response is difficult because the ocean, a primary determinant 
of the response time, operates on multiple time scales. There is, therefore, no unique way to 
define a response time – and different ways to define a response time will lead to different 
values. The way the response time is defined here is to consider the response to a step forcing 
change of 5 W/m
2, and define the response time as if the response were exponential. The 
response time (￿) is then how long it takes for the temperature to reach (1 – 1/e) of the 
equilibrium response. 
Note that, if the response were exponential, and characterized by a single time scale, then 
one would reach (1 – 1/e
2) of the equilibrium response after a time equal to 2￿. In fact, it takes 
much longer than this to reach this point – a consequence of the fact that, as time goes by, the 
influence of deeper layers in the ocean becomes increasingly more important. This effectively 
causes the thermal inertia of the system to increase with time, so the system’s characteristic 
response time scale also increases with time. Equally, the initial response is much more rapid 
than the exponential decay model would lead one to expect – representing the response of the 
oceanic mixed layer with its relatively small thermal inertia. In spite of these deficiencies, a one-
box model still captures the essential features of the system’s response, provided an appropriate 
response time is used. Here we choose appropriate response times using the upwelling-diffusion,   29
energy-balance climate model MAGICC,
36-37 the same model that was used for global-mean 
temperature projections in the IPCC TAR. MAGICC, in turn, has been calibrated against a 
number of state-of-the-art coupled atmosphere/ocean GCMs. 
The main determinants of the response time, ￿, are the climate sensitivity (￿T2x; °C), 
and the effective vertical diffusivity of the ocean (Kz; cm
2/sec). Table A1 gives ￿ results (in 
years) from MAGICC, using TAR best-estimate results for all other parameters. In parentheses 
are approximate results obtained using the following best-fit formula: 
￿ = [a + b(￿T2x)]
2 
a = 0.04233(Kz)
2 – 0.4261(Kz) + 0.466 
b = -0.06071(Kz)
2 + 0.7277(Kz) + 0.668 
Note that the dependence of ￿ on ￿T2x is crucial. 
Table A1. ￿ Results (in years) from MAGICC 










Kz = 1.0 cm
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As a test, the best-estimate (median) values for ￿T2x and Kz are 2.6°C and 2.3 cm
2/sec 
(see ref. 11). The MAGICC value for ￿ is 24.3 years. The above formula gives a value of 24.6 
years. Extrapolation outside the above parameter ranges will lead to errors, but the probability of 
being outside the above ranges is small. 
                                                           
36 Wigley, T. M. L. and S. C. B. Raper (1992). “Implications for Climate and Sea Level of Revised IPCC Emissions 
Scenarios”, Nature, 357, 293-300. 
37 Wigley, T. M. L. and S. C. B. Raper (2002). “Reasons for Larger Warming Projections in the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report”, Journal of Climate, 15, 2945-2952. 